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INTRODUCTION

The concept at the forefront of the anti-communist movement behind the Iron Curtain was neither capitalism nor democracy, but
"civil society."'
The underlying premise of the civil society movement was that the Marxist-Leninist assertion of the State's all-encompassing authority over all sectors was a falsehood because
independent, private associations exercised authority over portions of
citizens' lives.
Under communism, the dangers to civil society were state-imposed
restrictions. The State had attempted to monopolize all "strategic positions"2' or resources necessary for an institution or individual to
function independently in society. The monopolization of private
property rights and other means necessary for the manifestation of
consciousness were crucial to the Marxist-Leninist State's restriction
of civil society.
Now the advocates of civil society are running the post-communist
States. Nevertheless, civil society is still in danger. Indeed, the Prime
Minister of Bulgaria and the President of Czechoslovakia each recently told Western audiences that the greatest problem confronting
their countries was neither the establishment of democratic institutions nor the transition to a rational economic system, but the task of
3
rejuvenating civil society.
At the foundation of the civil society crisis is the new regimes' inheritance of the communist States' control over all strategic positions.
1. "Civil society" functions in European intellectual history as a rough equivalent to "private
sector associations" in American terminology. The term "civil society institution" can cover any
non-State hierarchy, including a nuclear family, a church, a business corporation, a political
party, and even an individual. As Part I explains, civil society has been used to refer to (1) a
relatively homogeneous, politically dominant group of individuals or associations, (2) a pre-political, heterogeneous plurality of autonomous non-State entities, and (3) an interacting group of
institutions that function as intermediaries between the consciousness(es) of the populace and the
State.
I do not distinguish between purely private society and non-State, public or political society.
In fact, all private institutions could, given the strategic resources, play a public or political role
by making input into the State. Similarly, all private institutions are potentially subject to the
influence of the State to some extent. However, I do make a distinction between public interaction among civil society's members and the private definition of a personal or institutional identity by civil society's members. See infra notes 24, 31, and text accompanying notes 68-70.
2. The term "strategic positions" is used by Michel Foucault to describe-via an analogy to
what is necessary for a successful military exercise-what is necessary for an authentic discipline
to flourish. EDWARD SAID, THE WORLD, THE TEXT, THE CRITIC 221 (1983) (quoting MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DIscIPLINE AND PUNISH 26 (1978)). Disciplines underlie all that is signified and all

that plays a role in society. Each discipline necessitates a unique set of "strategic positions" to
function. These positions include the intended ideas and the means of manifesting those ideas.
Many disciplines share needs for the same scarce strategic resources.
3. Philip Dimitrov, Freeing the Soulfrom Communism, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1992, at A10;
Viclav Havel, ParadiseLost, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKs, Apr. 9, 1992, at 6.
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Civil society will be able to thrive only after those strategic positions
are privatized. The most notable privatization processes are property
sales and the creation of property right entitlements as compensation
for takings by previous regimes. 4 But privatization encompasses
much more than the distribution of a State's rights to land and shares
in companies. Important State resources that must be privatized in
order for civil society to function include access to and control over
the media, education, the environment, and political campaigns.
The necessity of privatization for a functional civil society gives
rise to the post-communist paradox. The movement behind the elimination of communism stood for the primacy of the pre-political. 5 Yet,
the only way for the pre-political to triumph is through privatization,
which entails State action on a scale equalled only by a transition to
totalitarianism. The debilitated condition of civil society compounds
the burden of the State's massive privatization mission. A paucity of
post-communist civil society institutions exists. Moreover, those institutions that do exist either are elitist, in the sense that they lack a
foundation among the citizenry, or strive to exercise a disproportionate degree of control over State resources. These circumstances render
traditional liberalism 6 of limited use. Nevertheless, as traditional liberalism correctly points out, the State's new role as subsidizer and promoter of civil society may well be just as oppressive as the old State
role of totalitarian suppressor.
4. By the spring of 1992, about 10-15% of State property had been privatized. For discussions of factors inhibiting the privatization process, see Roman Frydman & Andrzej Rapaczynski, Institutional Reform in Eastern Europe: Evolution or Design?, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1; Ethan
Klingsberg, Judicial Review and Hungary's Transition from Communism to Democracy: The
Constitutional Court, the Continuity ofLaw, and the Redefinition of Property Rights, 1992 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 41, 69-70, 82-83 & n.95, 117-19 [hereinafter Judicial Review]; Ethan Klingsberg, Hungary: The Constitutional Politics of Compensation, SOVIET & E. EUR. L., June, 1991, at 1; Ivan
Major, Why Eastern Europe is Going Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1992, at A21; DAVID
STARK, PRIVATIZATION IN HUNGARY: FROM PLAN TO MARKET OR FROM PLAN TO CLAN,

Cornell Project on Comparative Institutional Analysis, Working Papers on Transitions from
State Socialism (1990) [hereinafter PRIVATIZATION IN HUNGARY].
Czechoslovakia and Poland are privatizing a limited number of large public enterprises via
"mass privatization programs." In Czechoslovakia, citizens can buy vouchers to purchase shares
at public auctions. In Poland, citizens receive free shares in private management funds, which
then purchase State enterprises. Hungary and Germany have avoided such programs. Romania
has tentatively drawn up a mass privatization plan. Such plans may replace the State's role with
a select group of new mutual funds, which either buy up vouchers (Czechoslovakia) or manage
shares as they are issued (Poland). For discussions of these plans for selling certain large public
enterprises, see Frydman & Rapaczynski, supra;David Stark, Path Dependence and Privatization
Strategies in East Central Europe, 6 E. EUR. POL. & SOCIETIES 17 (1992) [hereinafter Path
Dependence].
5. See infra part II (defining the "pre-political" as that which is unconditioned by State
action).
6. By "traditional liberalism," I refer to historical and philosophical skepticism of State
action.
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With respect to the post-communist world, American legal scholars have dedicated substantial resources to the development of models
for independent judiciaries, the efficient transfer of State industries to
private ownership, responsible prosecutorial systems, and reformed
constitutions and legal codes; but they have often failed to address
directly the civil society issue. Reformers must focus their energies
not only on translating Western political and economic designs, but
also on concerns for the protection and development of social autonomy amidst the paradoxical situation in which post-communist States
and societies currently find themselves. This article lays a foundation
for remedying this oversight in Western legal scholarship on transitions from communism. This task is important because the future of
democracy, justice, and capitalism in post-communist Europe will not
be derived exclusively from "master blueprints, but [will be] shaped by
7
the specific institutional resources" of civil society.
A preliminary discussion of civil society theory, as it has developed
both in the West and among Soviet bloc dissidents, is necessary both
to understand fully the elements of the current civil society crisis and
to arrive at solutions. Part I provides an overview of trends in the
intellectual history of civil society theory in the West. Since the rejection of the classical notion of a unified State and civil society, Western
commentators have focused their analyses on State action's effect upon
modern civil society. In reaction to the dangers of State co-optation of
civil society's autonomy, social critics have proposed a range of solutions, such as limitations on State power to interfere in areas like property rights and the assumption of power by a universal class.
Part I concludes by explaining a sophisticated middle ground articulated in recent post-Marxist criticism. This approach rejects State
passivity toward the private sector's development of repressive hierarchies, but advocates limitations on State interference to prevent the
State from playing a despotic, ideological role. These social critics advocate State action "to carve out space" for the development of civil
society, as opposed to State action that "penetrates" civil society with
the result of co-optation.
At its heart, I argue, the goal of this latter vision is actually the
public re-creation of classical civil society on a larger, more heterogeneous scale. The debates among autonomous actors that shaped the
classical State can exist in a more dynamic, drawn-out and noisy fashion in a modern civil society, as long as the State provides the mecha7. Stark, Path Dependence, supra note 4, at 23.
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nisms to assure the participation of a multiplicity of autonomous
members of civil society.
Part II reviews Soviet bloc dissidents' contributions to civil society
theory. Instead of focusing upon the effect of State action on civil
society, the dissidents tended to write about the pre-political character
of civil society. Dissident theory exalts personal truths as the source
of all civil society and emphasizes the irrelevancy of attempts to condition those truths. Despite their emphasis on individual truths as "absolutes," the dissidents recognized the significance of limiting public
and private institutions, as well as the importance of dialogue and dynamism. Part II concludes that even though post-Marxist Western
theory and dissident theory have different starting points-the West
usually begins with the effect of State output on civil society, while the
dissidents begin with the nature of pre-political civil society-they
both give rise to similar visions of the relationship between the State
and civil society.
Part III examines the problem of attaining the goal of a dynamic,
modem civil society after the change from communism to democracy
in Eastern Europe.8 This section compares the post-communist transitions with Jirgen Habermas's two models for the relation between
civil society and a change of regime. Habermas explains how the
American Revolution deferred to the "common sense" of already-existing civil society, while the French Revolution attempted to construct and to mobilize a new, "correct" civil society. I then explain
why the post-communist transitions fit neither of those models. Unlike the American colonies, the former Soviet bloc has few contemporarily relevant, traditional institutions of civil society.
Moreover, those authentic institutions that do exist are in a debilitated, resourceless condition. Furthermore, the French Revolution
approach has little appeal for those in the midst of a failed utopia.
Nevertheless, these models have some relevance. Part III argues that
the post-communists should adopt an appropriate synthesis of the
French affinity for State mobilization and the American respect for the
pre-political.
Part III then reviews the manner in which civil society has actually
developed in post-communist Europe. During the early days of
change in 1989, authentic civil society appeared to flourish on both a
8. This article uses the term "Eastern Europe" for consistency with the other articles in this
symposium, without intending to imply either that the region is a monolithic block or that the
region is separate from the rest of Europe. See Wiktor Osiatynski, Revolutions in Eastern Europe
(Review Essay) 58 U. CHi. L. REV. 823, 851 (1991) ("It seems clear that Eastern Europe does
not exist. The phrase has fallen out of usage even within the region.").
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private and public level. That was after the collapse of communism,
but before significant new hierarchies had a chance to impose themselves on others in society. Since then the crisis of civil society has
arisen. The public sector and fledgling private sector currently operate
in a manner that fails to empower large segments of civil society. In
addition to reviewing the origins and elements of this crisis, Part III
explains why this crisis presents risks to the success of the democratic
and economic transitions in the region.
Part IV demonstrates how post-communist constitutionalism can
function, and already has functioned in Hungary, to help resolve the
crisis. The enforcement of constitutional rights need not function as a
vehicle for servicing State clientele to sustain the authority of elites. A
jurisprudence of rights can function to protect and nurture the type of
modern civil society to which the social commentaries of Parts I and
II aspire. As a result of the inevitability of a prominent State role in
the provision of resources for post-communist civil society, the next
challenge for post-communist constitutionalism will be the development of guiding principles that permit the State to rebuild civil society
without suppressing civil society's essence.
Part IV proposes that constitutional courts review State action
taken to eliminate and to retain the State's monopoly on resources.
These courts would ensure that post-communist States structure the
privatization of State resources in a manner that does not neglect those
constitutional rights relevant to the existence of dynamic, modern civil
society. One area of proposed review, pursuant to the protection of
free speech rights, is State decisions on private access to state-dominated media outlets. To assist in determining when privatization decisions facilitate the development of civil society and when they hinder
that development, Part IV provides a critique of the U.S. Supreme
Court's constitutional review of State regulations of private rights of
access to forums for communication. My analysis shows the concerns
that the Supreme Court has found relevant to the constitutionality of
such regulations. I then explain which of those concerns are appropriate, in light of the particular circumstances outlined in Part III, for use
in post-communist constitutional review of potentially discriminatory
privatization decisions.
I.

ISSUES AND TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN

CIVIL SOCIETY THEORY

The concept of civil society originated in ancient Greece (koinonia
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politike) and pre-imperial Rome (civitas).9 Classical civil society was

composed of the select group of autonomous individuals who interacted to create the mature rules of practical reason for a given community. The imperatives that emerged from civil society contained,
dominated, and ultimately defined the community. Accordingly, the
role of "civil society was coterminous with the state."10 Civitas was
actually the form of government.
By the mid-eighteenth century, European political observers had
come to associate despotism with the unification of the State and civil
society. "I An ongoing debate ensued over an appropriate modem concept of civil society. The essence of these modem concepts of civil
society is "the strategic importance of guarding against [classical civil
society's] authoritarian potential by fostering the growth of independent 'societies' within civil society."' 2 The underlying reasoning is that
the organization of autonomous identities undermines any attempt by
any particular identity to assume a despotic position of authority.
Two problems plague modem concepts of civil society: (1) the destruction of a unifying public spirit and ethos by a cacophony of competing identities, and (2) the suppression of autonomy as a result of
both the unequal distribution of resources among societies and the
existence of a neglected society within every empowered society.
Adam Ferguson's eighteenth century Essay on the History of Civil Society highlights the first problem with rhetorical flair.' 3 Ferguson observed the consequences of both capitalist economic competition and
cultural intolerance. He sees the death of classical civil society as having unleashed " 'a scene for the gratification of mere vanity, avarice,
and ambition' " in which different interests are "always ready to trespass on the rights of others."' 4 If the State and civil society are no
longer one, then Ferguson suggests that a means must be found to
ensure mutual respect among the members of diverse societies.
Ironically, the way to encourage a sense of civic virtue in modern
civil society is to guarantee the empowerment of diverse groups and
autonomous individuals. Attempts to dominate absolutely are futile in
the face of such a guarantee. If no group's interests can be ignored,
9. Andrew Arato & Jean Cohen, Civil Society and Social Theory, 21 THESIS ELEVEN 40, 61
n.6 (1988); John Keane, Despotism and Democracy, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE: NEW
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 35-36 (John Keane ed., 1988).
10. Keane, supra note 9, at 35.
11. Id. at 65.
12. Id. at 37. See supra note I (providing examples of civil society hierarchies).
13. Id. at 39-44 (quoting extensively from ADAM FERGUSON, AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY
OF CIVIL SOCIETY (1767) (Duncan Forbes ed., 1966)).

14. Id. at 41-42.
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then the. conflicting interests are forced to cooperate in a "public
spirit." As steps toward such an end, Ferguson suggested safeguards
such as the protection of civil liberties and the presence of members
from all walks of life on juries and in citizen militias.' 5
The administrator of any attempt to guarantee the empowerment
and participation of diverse groups and autonomous individuals must
be the State. Hegel expounded on this remedy at great length in The
Philosophy of Right, his reaction to the "blind and unstable field of
economic competition among private non-citizens."' 6 The State's
role, according to Hegel, is to introduce mechanisms that undo the
inequalities among competing autonomous sectors and to pursue universal interests.17 Without "the higher surveillance of the state," certain "Corporations" or private sector groups "would ossify, build
themselves in, and decline into a miserable system of castes."'" The
State has to intervene in the private sector to protect civil society from
oppression by private sector hierarchies.
Most critiques of The Philosophy of Right point to the second problem with modem civil society. The Hegelian quest for state-sanctioned equality requires the secular deification of the State's
rationality, a concept which is easily attacked. 19 Alexis de Tocqueville, writing at approximately the same time as Hegel, feared that a
Hegelian model would sanction interference with so-called "sacred"
property rights and ultimately lead to the "administrative suffocation
' 20
of civil society."
De Tocqueville was probably most upset by the potential for the
State to "suffocate" the status quo, propertied powers of the private
sector. The same danger of "suffocation," however, exists with respect
to State attempts to assist disempowered elements of society. In a
15. Id. at 43; cf Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131
(1991) (discussing the interrelated functions of juries, citizen militias, and fundamental rights).
Arguably, a source of unity like a crown or nationalism is necessary for there to be "public
spirit" in civil society.
16. Keane, supra note 9, at 52.

17. Id. at 53;

ROBERT MEISTER, POLITICAL IDENTITY

160-61 (1990).

18. MEISTER, supra note 17, at 177 n.1 (quoting Hegel).
19. See, e.g., Keane, supra note 9, at 54; MEISTER, supra note 17, at 188-89; ROBERTO M.
UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY (1976). Indeed, Hegel often hints in his own work that he is
presenting an overly idealized conception of the modern State's potential.
20. Keane, supra note 9, at 58; see MEISTER, supra note 17, at 132-33 (discussing de Tocqueville's prudent democracy). James Madison had similar concerns about the potential negative
effects that could stem from a State empowered to engage in property right reform. See Stephen
Holmes, Precommitmentand the Paradoxof Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 220 (Jon Elster and Rune Slagstaad eds., 1988) (discussing Madisonian prudence on property right reform); Klingsberg, Judicial Review, supra note 4, at 86-88, 107 & n.163 (discussing
interaction between Madison's views on popular sovereignty and property right reform).
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world of scarce resources, the State is bound to oversimplify in its rational attempts to equalize. A multiplicity of civil societies exist
within each group that the State can recognize. The empowerment of
any group is bound to be at the expense of neglecting to empower the
diversity within each group. 2t More significantly, when the State is
the source of empowerment, the members of civil society become dependent upon the State for organizational guidance and ultimately
22
may sacrifice their autonomous voice in return for State assistance.
In such scenarios, State empowerment efforts function as violent impositions on the autonomy of those being assisted.
The problem with this critique of Hegel's secular deification of the
State is that such criticism focuses only on the State's output-i.e., the
role of the State in molding civil society. The other stage is the creation and definition of the State through input from civil society. If a
complete range of autonomously formulated private interests characterize the input stage, then the modem State can enjoy the legitimacy
of classical civil society and avoid the dangers of despotism outlined
by de Tocqueville and others.
Theories of modem civil society indicate an aspiration to re-create
classical civil society, at least on the level of public interaction, in a
more drawn-out, large-scale, and heterogeneous version. Classical
civil society "entailed a vision of an autonomous-domination-free association of peers who communicatively establish their goals and
norms."' 23 If we could see those autonomous Greek peers arguing today, we would probably see ugly arguments in which each diverse individual relied on strategic resources to enable his preference to
prevail. Today, the diversity of views in civil society is greater, but
that does not necessarily mean that there cannot be "autonomousdomination-free participation" by modem civil society institutions in
defining the State. 24 Action by a State, which had been created by
21. See M.M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION 426 (Michael Holquist ed., Caryl
Emerson & Michael Holquist trans., 1981) (discussing political figures' delusions of
"unitariness").
22. Arato & Cohen, supra note 9 (criticizing the welfare state).
23. Id. at 61 n.6.
24. The actual difference between modem and classical civil society is that in classical civil
society the results of the arguments between the diverse peers resulted in the sole set of rules. In
modern civil society, there are both the rules derived from the interaction between civil society
institutions and individuals, and the rules of each individual and private institution unto itself.
See infra text accompanying notes 68-70. When I refer to "modern civil society," I intend to
imply a multiplicity of societies/communities. Cf. Stephen Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the
Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L. REV. 685, 698-99 (1992) (discussing differences between
Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft).
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such a society, would arguably nurture and be responsive to, rather
than suffocate, civil society.
Marx was an outspoken skeptic of such aspirations in the modern
world. As long as there was any separation between the State and civil
society, Marx saw it as inevitable that the State would attempt to stabilize its position through selectively empowering certain of civil society's groups, which would then function as corporate clientele of the
regime. 25 In this respect, contemporary Marxists claim that a true
Marxist analysis, based on Marx's critique of Hegel's Philosophy of
Right, would identify the Communist Party's "stabilizing (and repressive) function" in relation to the modem civil societies of the Soviet
26
bloc during the past four decades.
The problem with Marx's criticism of Hegel is that it leaves no
means for grounding the State in the full range of identities in modern
civil society, unless the cacophony of modernity is glossed over and
faith is put into a universal class which can arise to unify State and
society. In the modern world, where factors like communications and
travel have brought radically diverse communities within the same
State, such efforts will inevitably fail and result in repressive fiascos
like the former communist world. The preferable course is the further
pursuit of the goal, shared by both Hegel and de Tocqueville, of having diverse civil associations, which are separate from the State, serve
as "crucial barriers against ... political despotism. ' 27
Recent post-Marxist, Western conceptions of civil society suggest
emulations of classical civil society, but not in the Marxist direction of
striving towards an artificially unified utopia. Instead, the post-Marxist focus is on the potential, as discussed above, for modern civil society to emulate classical civil society's capacity to give rise to a public
dialogue between diverse, autonomous interests. Sociologists Andrew
Arato and Jean Cohen, in an article drawing on the insights of Jirgen
Habermas, provide guidelines for attaining such a goal. 28 The AratoCohen approach attempts to overcome simultaneously each of the two
primary problems with modern civil society. 29
In response to concerns about the dangers of "the dissolution of an
25. MEISTER, supra note 17, at 193-94 (paraphrasing Marx's critique of Hegel's PHILOSOPHY
OF RIGHT: "differential power of groups in society is itself an artifact of state power"); id. at 20001 (regimes attempt to stabilize themselves by creating and favoring corporate clientele).
26. Id. at 233.
27. Keane, supra note 9, at 61.
28. Arato & Cohen, supra note 9; see generally ANDREW ARATO & JEAN COHEN, CIVIL
SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1992).
29. See supra text accompanying notes 12-22.
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all-encompassing ethos,"' 30 they build upon the realization that the
guarantee of the autonomy of groups and individuals leads to constructive public dialogue. They foresee the potential for interaction on
a grand scale: the "communicative opening up of the sacred core of
traditions, norms and authority to processes of questioning and discursive adjudication. It entails the replacement of a conventionally-based
normative consensus by one that is reflexive, post-conventional, and
31
grounded in open processes of communication.
In response to the concern that State action inevitably co-opts civil
society, Arato and Cohen point out that such a view erroneously "focus[es] exclusively on the role of law, and even rights, as a medium
[for exploitation and exclusion], while dismissing its freedom-securing,
empowering institutional moment as mere show."' 32 Law can function
not only to violently structure civil society, 33 but also as "an institution that secures and formalizes the normative accomplishments of the
lifeworld. '' 34 Law need not only protect select clientele hierarchies; it
35
can be used simultaneously to empower a heterotopia.
In the Arato-Cohen portrayal of State action, "penetration" is bad,
while "carving out" is good. 36 The latter enables autonomous interests within civil society to thrive, while the former intrudes to attempt
to shape civil society in a specific image. In particular, they argue that
the law must carve out non-economic private spheres and non-State
public spheres to ensure that hierarchies of money and political power,
respectively, do not exclusively dominate society. 37 The restriction of
30. Arato & Cohen, supra note 9, at 45.
31. Id. at 44. Engagement in such public, post-conventional interaction does not entail the
abandonment of strict adherence to conventions on a private level. See infra text accompanying
notes 68-70. Indeed, as stated above, what makes this public, post-conventional interaction possible is the private, autonomous development of personal and institutional norms.
32. Id. at 51 (criticizing Foucault). Similarly, Habermas complains that Foucault's critique
"
of the subjectivity of liberal legalism 'filters out all the aspects under which the eroticization
and internalization of subjective nature also meant a gain in freedom and expression.' " Richard
Rorty, Foucault/Dewey/Nietzsche, RARITAN, Spring, 1990, at 3 (quoting Habermas).
33. See JURGEN HABERMAS, PHILOSOPHICAL-POLITICAL PROFILES 184 (Frederick Lawrence trans., 1983) (discussing "structural violence" of political systems).
34. Arato & Cohen, supra note 9, at 50.
35. Id. at 51.
36. See id. at 53.
37. Id.
[W]e must use the market and use the state but regard neither as the primary locus of
human emancipation. Rather, if we speak of democratic politics in Arendtian or Habermasian terms, we must realize that this locus is in civil society. This ... is the post-liberal,
post-Marxian insight.
ANDREW ARATO ET AL., MARXISM AND LIBERALISM: SUMMARY OF NEW YORK DEMOCRACY
SEMINAR 10 (Democracy Seminar Working Paper Series No. 2, 1988).

The outlook upon rights as protecting society from the infringement of the State, as well as
is of great importance in
from private sector forces, can be traced back to James Madison: " '[I]t
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the State to "carving out" space so that a multiplicity of civil societies
can thrive is critical to whether a nation's future can be shaped "from
below" by the potential grand interaction of modem civil society.
II.

DISSIDENT

38

CIVIL SOCIETY THEORY:

AUTONOMY, SELF-

LIMITATION, AND DYNAMISM

Modem civil society can be outlined by a continuum of input into
the State and output from the State: civil society > State > civil
society.... While Western social theorists were primarily analyzing
the effect of State output in a modem civil society, dissidents from
behind the Iron Curtain were avidly writing about the pre-political
side of civil society.
The fundamental premise of most dissident theory is that "consciousness is on its own" and is independent of State devices. 39 Dissidents designated civil society as the product of such pre-political
consciousness-a sacred concept in a lifeworld corrupted by State

violence.
The elevation of the autonomy of individual value choices to the
level of a theory of resistance to despotism provided a means for
delegitimizing the apparent authority of State institutions. Viclav
Havel, for instance, contrasted the basis of communist authority in
"[s]ystem, ideology and apparat" with the dissidents' foundations in
"our conscience, our natural understanding. '" 40 Dissidents generally
had little else on their side to legitimize their views. Except for those
involved with the Polish Solidarity Movement, religious leaders, and a
few sporadic exceptions elsewhere, most dissidents lacked mass popularity or even symbolic authority among underground communities or
associations. 4 1 They could only claim adherence to a personal, uncona republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part
of the society against the injustice of the other part.' " Amar, supra note 15, at 1132-33 (quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
38. In this section I outline an idealized "dissident theory of civil society." This is not
intended to be a comprehensive scientific survey of the diverse and complex philosophies of
dissidents throughout the former Soviet bloc. Instead, the purpose is to relate trends in civil
society theory that are useful for understanding how to resolve the current civil society crisis in
the post-communist world. Similarly, part III's descriptions of the crisis of civil society
generalize about common problems that vary in degree in each country. For an excellent
discussion of the pitfalls of generalizing about a single anti-communist movement, transition, or
post-communist crisis, see Osiatynski, supra note 8, at 837-51.
39. See, e.g., JOSEPH BRODSKY, LESS THAN ONE 3 (1986).
40. Vficlav Havel, Anti-Political Politics, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE: NEW EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 9, at 388.
41. See Klingsberg, Judicial Review, supra note 4, at 142-43 & n.264 (discussing the affinity
of dissidents for natural law).
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ditioned moral imperative. 42
In Western social criticism, Michel Foucault's writings carried to
an extreme this aversion to the violent infringement of power systems
upon authentic consciousness. For Foucault, State violence penetrated all structures in both the public and private sectors, and therefore only rare, spontaneous outbursts of autonomy were entitled to be
designated natural or authentic reflections of consciousness. Edward
Said, who would like to see Western critics become more comfortable
with a socially active role, denounces "Foucault['s] more or less
eliminat[ion of] the central dialectic of opposed forces that still underlies modern society, despite the apparently perfected methods of
'technotronic' control and seemingly nonideological efficiency that
seem to govern everything. ' 43 Foucault focused on the illegitimacy of
"tactics and strategies of power" to the point that he eclipsed room for
faith in the potential for institutionalized consciousness ever to occupy
a strategic position of power." The dissidents differ from Foucault in
a manner similar to Said. The underground advocates of civil society
in the communist world usually conceded that more traditional associations-such as the family, religious groups, and various types of
intellectual circles-could function and interact, if they had the resources and the space, as legitimate outgrowths of authentic
consciousness.

45

Despite this vision of the illegitimacy of the State and the legitimacy of civil society, the dissidents were not neo-classicists who
yearned for civil society to replace the State. The dissidents had an
ambiguous attitude toward the role of the State. They considered politics as both an inauthentic power system to be avoided and a force
42. Dimitrov, supra note 3 (communists could not "destroy completely civil society or vanquish the moral imperative").
43. SAID, supra note 2, at 221.
44. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE 77 (Colin Gordon ed. & Colin Gordon
et al. trans., 1980) (describing his shift of focus from "consciousness" to "tactics and strategies of
power"); SAID, supra note 2, at 222 (contrasting Foucault's critiques of power with those of
Gramsci "for whom the fascinated description of exercised power is never a substitute for trying
to change power relationships within society"). Antonio Gramsci, despite his penetrating critiques, was much less ambiguous than Foucault in retention of confidence in the duality between
power in society grounded in authenticity and power grounded in exploitation of State violence
and technique. See ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Quintin
Hoare & Geoffrey N. Smith trans., 1971).
45. Dissident criticism of Marxist-Leninism's use of the "technology of power" to enforce
metaphysical pretenses "does nothing to show that there is something wrong with whatever networks of power are required to shape people into individuals with a sense of moral responsibility." Rorty, supra note 32, at 7 (arguing that Foucault's anti-Platonism should not delegitimize
all private uses of power). The way critics like Franz Fanon, Edward Said, and many East
European dissidents are able logically to condemn one power structure and then affirm another is
explained infra at text accompanying notes 66-70; 81-82.
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with which civil society had to reckon. Dissident civil society advocates often denied interest in State subsidization of private sector interest groups. Political support was for compromising reformers, rather
than autonomous associations. The fantasy of the State incorporating
civil society groups as new clientele had lost favor after the brutal
crushing of reform efforts, such as that led by Imre Nagy in Hungary
in 195646 and the 1968 Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia. An initiative
to utilize a communist State to emancipate authentic civil society
would lead only to additional State co-optation and denigration of the
civil society institution, because of the communist regime's willingness
to use violence to entrench the status quo.
Nevertheless, the dissidents recognized that the State plays a critical role in relation to modem civil society. Even though they insisted
that civil society's exclusive source had to be "intrinsic moral and ethical inclinations, ' 47 they realized that the State had the power to force
people to live in accordance with "uninhabitable fiction[s], ' 4 8 to "surrender[ ] individual reason and conscience," '4 9 and to alienate persons
from themselves.5 0 Hence, politics could not be ignored. Havel set a
precedent for dissident political philosophy when he reasoned that
civil society advocacy entailed the endorsement of "anti-political politics": "politics not as technology of power and manipulation, of cybernetic rule over humans or as the art of the useful, but politics as
one of the ways of seeking and achieving meaningful lives." 5'
The implications of "anti-political politics" are subject to misunderstanding. There is a tendency to interpret the call to use politics as
a means for achieving meaningful lives, coupled with the dissident re5 2
jection of reformist compromises, as a call for revolutionary politics.
In dissident writings, the emphasis on intrinsic truths5 3 as the source
46. The 1956 movement had an element of spontaneous revolution, as well as reformism.
Imre Nagy embodied 1956's reformist character. However, by October 24, 1956, the masses
quickly forgot about Nagy and reform communism, because pluralism appeared to be at hand.
Charles Gati, From Liberation to Revolution, in A HISTORY OF HUNGARY 380 (P. Sugar et al.
eds., 1990).
47. Dimitrov, supra note 3.
48. Havel, supra note 40, at 394.
49. Id.
50. Dimitrov, supra note 3.
51. Havel, supra note 40, at 396-97; see also GEORGE KONRD, ANTIPOLITICS (Richard E.
Allen trans., 1984). I oversimplify, for purposes of this article, in stating that all dissidents
agreed with Havel's approach to politics. See supra note 38.
52. By "revolutionary politics," I refer to the conception of a permanent and totalistic
change. I do not incorporate conceptions of "self-limiting revolution," often referred to in Polish
literature, or "liberal revolution," frequently used in recent work by Bruce Ackerman.
53. For example, Havel wrote in 1984: "At the basis of this world are values which are
simply there, perenially, before we ever speak of them, before we reflect upon them and inquire
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for both civil society and a future anti-political State comes perilously
close to sounding like advocacy of a new enlightenment political philosophy that could be just as imposing upon civil society as the notion
of the universal proletariat. Havel, in particular, frequently referred to
a metaphysical "Absolute" 5 4 when arguing in favor of civil society institutions and against the communist regime. Consequently, one
Western legal commentator argues that Havel's approach "may have
its virtues as a mode of dissent in a totalitarian society," 55 but its suc'56
cess could pose "the greatest threat to liberty."
Despite a superficial appearance to the contrary, dissident theory
recognized the importance of self-limitation, dynamism, and dialogue
among the participants in a modern civil society. Havel was quick to
note the sense in which he invoked the metaphysical: "Th[e] Absolute
is something which we can only quietly respect; any attempt to spurn
it, master it or replace it with something else appears, within the
framework of the natural world, as an expression of hybris for which
humans must pay a heavy price, as did Don Juan and Faust."' 57 Individual and institutional adherence to self-generated values and imperatives leads to self-limitation and open-ended interaction, because the
generation of these absolute truths is a dynamic, infinite process.
Havel's "Absolute"-based civil society has more in common with
the affirmation of humanism in the the work of Samuel Beckett, another playwright whose writing is inspired by real life experiences resisting totalitarianism,5 8 than with advocacy of an imposing, rigid, and
revolutionary ideology.5 9 Beckett's extreme respect for absolute truths
results in his work mocking scientific systems and other marks of privileged communications. 6° All imposing structures and ideologies
deconstruct humorously in his characters' eyes due to those characters' affirmative faith in authenticity, as opposed to nihilism. Despite
about them." Havel, supra note 40, at 382. Havel's dissident motto was "to live in truth."
Havel, supra note 3, at 7.
54. Havel, supra note 40, at 389.
55. Robin West, The Supreme Court 1989 Term: Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104
HARV. L. REV. 43, 76 (1990).
56. Id. at 77. West criticizes the unreliability of depending exclusively on leaders' adherence
to moral restraints, as opposed to constitutional restraints. Id. Elsewhere, West endorses
Havel's emphasis on moral foundations as constructive. Id. at 71-76.
57. Havel, supra note 40, at 383.
58. DIERDRE BAIR, SAMUEL BECKETIT 320 (1978) (Beckett's witnessing of World War II as
an active member of the Resistance was critical to his post-War writing).
59. See also Rorty, supra note 32, at I (arguing that Dewey's liberal democratic vision entailed "autonomy in purely human terms," as opposed to "universalistic self-justifications.").
60. See, e.g. Samuel Beckett's trilogy, MOLLOY (1955), MALONE DIES (1956), and THE UNNAMABLE (1958).
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Beckett's characters' constant, seemingly all-encompassing negation
("I can't go on"), 6 1 they are always driven by a faith that authenticity
62
is present within the human self ("I'll go on").
The similar use of the Absolute in Beckett and in dissident theory
comes forth poignantly in Catastrophe, the drama within a drama,
which Beckett wrote for the imprisoned Havel in 1983.63 The play
portrays the preparation of the character called "Protagonist" for a
play. He is dressed, powdered, arranged, and physically manipulated
as if he were a mannequin. In the play within Catastrophe,Protagonist has no opportunity to utter lines, to engage in movement, or even
to make facial expressions. Any of those opportunities would entail
space for autonomous input from Protagonist. The role of Protagonist
corresponds nicely with what Havel was writing, at approximately the
same time, about the detached role of individuals in relation to States:
"States grow ever more machine-like; people are transformed into
casts of extras, as voters, producers, consumers, patients, tourists or
soldiers."64
Toward the end of Catastrophe, the "Director" character gives the
signal that the play can commence. Everything appears to be in order,
as Protagonist stands with his head bowed woodenly and the pre-recorded applause begins to fill the theater. But a catastrophe strikes the
play. In a simple but haunting move, as the official, pre-recorded applause for Director's creation is heard, Protagonist suddenly raises his
head and stares at the audience. The mechanized applause ceases.
With a simple humanist gesture, Protagonist ruptures the entire symbolic 65 set forth by Director. Suddenly, a rich silence rules the stage.

One recent production of Catastrophe inserted the Czech national anthem, rather than silence, after Protagonist raised his head and the
pre-recorded applause ceased. However, the radical humanist
message of the dissident is not another imposing tape recording, but
the silencing of recordings so that there is space for human beings to
come forward.
Such a courageous and deconstructive conception of the Absolute
61. SAMUEL BECKETT, THE UNNAMABLE 179 (1958).

62. Id.
63. Samuel Beckett, Catastrophe, in VACLAV HAVEL: LIVING IN TRUTH 199-203 (Jan

Vadislav ed., 1986).
64. Havel, supra note 40, at 388.
65. The notion of the "symbolic" refers to "differential elements, in themselves without
meaning, which acquire value only in their mutual relations-the question is whether this order
is or is not complete."

JACQUES LACAN, THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHO-

ANALYSIS 279 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1978). The "rupture" of the symbolic manifests that the
symbolic is not complete, because an element of previously overlooked mdconnaissance has
turned up within the attempted symbolic order.
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allies anti-political politics with the Arato-Cohen vision of modem
civil society, as opposed to revolutionary ideology. Part I explained
the Arato-Cohen approach as advocating (1) an open-ended, post-conventional, rational dialogue within modem civil society, which would
be made possible through (2) limitations on the capacity of State and
market institutions to dominate the public and private spheres. As to
the first component of the Arato-Cohen approach, the dissident conception of the Absolute opens up even the integrity of identified prepolitical consciousness to questioning. Such constructive questioning
constitutes part of the grand process of dialogue in the modem conception of civil society, rather than part of the suppression of authentic
individual development. 66 This dynamic dialogue on both an individual and communal level is what dissident Joseph Brodsky is talking
about when he describes the process of "gain[ing] an identity superior
to the confines of class, race, or ego. This is just plain common sense;
''
this is also the most sound program of social change there is. 67
Even though all pre-political consciousness is subject to constant
questioning and redefinition, dissident theory avoids resorting to a
Foucaultian eclipse of room for faith in the authenticity of individual
or institutional identity. Emulation of Foucault was not necessary because the dissident's quest to embody beliefs in a civil society institution did not entail the uncompromising advocacy of the imposition of
that institution's norms on the rest of society. 68 Dissidents were political and societal actors who adopted the privilege of poets-as opposed to philosophers-to manifest private authenticity (i.e., "to live
in truth") without asserting the "universal validity" of their positions. 69 Like Richard Rorty, dissidents viewed society as neither a
quasi-person nor a solitary civil institution; it is (at its liberal, social democratic best) a compromise between persons and private
70
institutions.
As to the protection of modem civil society from co-optation and
suffocation (the second crucial component of the Arato-Cohen framework), dissident writing tended to rely on the capacity of humanism,
rather than legal rights, to carve out and to preserve space for autonomous societal actors. The dissidents saw humanistically-based dyna66. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
67. BRODSKY, supra note 39, at 171.
68. See Rorty, supra note 32, at 4-5 (describing "knight of automony" in tradition of John
Dewey).
69. Id. at 7-8 (arguing that philosophers should be entitled to adopt the privilege of poets
once they "give up the hope of universalism").
70. Id. at 5.
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mism as potentially undercutting totalitarianism, 7' as well as all other
pretenses by public and private hierarchies toward imposing an ideological, as opposed to a deconstructing, Absolute. State clientele
structures and institutions would disintegrate in theory, as individuals
turned to authentic and dynamic institutions of civil society. Hungarian dissident George Konratd, author of an essay entitled "Antipolitics," explained: "totalitarian state power is stable only if civil
society is forced underground, shackled by fear and apathy, and
thereby reduced to the safety of the mousehole .... Whenever civil
society becomes more confident, however, the state rapidly loses its
grip.",72 The dissident civil society movement also made claims to the
capacity of its radical humanist emphasis to undermine the vulnerability of society to confinement by other abstractions, such as nationalism, 73

democracy, 74

constitutionalism, 75

social

justice, 76

the

movement, 77

international anti-communist
capitalism, or socialism
78
with a human face.
The dissidents of the communist world did not rally around a particular Virtue. As Mihily Vajda puts it, the message which emerged
from the anti-communist, civil society movement was: "Don't try to
tell me how to live."'79 The non-ideological, but energetic, defiance of
eccentric individualists, writers, and musicians symbolized the movement.80 Although certain dissidents privately embraced specific, rigid
71. See generally GUILLERMO O'DONNELL & PHILIPPE SCHMITFER, TRANSITIONS FROM
AUTHORITARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES 48-56

(1986) (discussing the relation between the resurrection of civil society and the decline of totalitarian regimes in Latin America); Gfibor Halmai, The Freedom of Assembly and Association
167-179 (unofficial translation of Hungarian language manuscript on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law) (discussing the development of civil associations in the years prior to
the end of communism in Hungary).
72. John Keane, Introduction to CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE: NEW EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES,

supra note 9, at 4.

73. Mihily Vajda, East-Central European Perspectives, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE:
NEW EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 9, at 349-50; TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, THE MAGIC

LANTERN 145-47 (1990) (discussing the dissident movements leading up to the events of 1989: it
was "a springtime of nations [but] not necessarily of nationalism; ... of societies aspiring to be
civil.").
74. Havel, supra note 40 ("a single seemingly powerless person who dares to cry out the
word of truth and to stand behind it with all his or her person and life, has, surprisingly, greater
power, though formally disenfranchised, than do thousands of anonymous voters."); Vajda,
supra note 73, at 349-50.
75. Vajda, supra note 73, at 349; West, supra note 55, at 63-71 (on Havel).
76. Vajda, supra note 73, at 349.
77. Havel, supra note 40, at 391, 397 (change comes about through "help[ing] ourselves"
rather than from outside help).
78. Id. at 392-93 (questions of capitalism versus socialism "have long since been beside the
point").
79. Vajda, supra note 73, at 350.
80. Havel, a playwright, explains in an interview with Lou Reed how Charter 77 was in-
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beliefs like Catholicism, they never converted such potentially imposing structures into revolutionary rallying cries to empower closed
communities.8 For dissidents, as Brodsky states in his description of
the premise of civilization in general, the "main vehicle-speaking
both metaphorically and literally-is translation. '8 2 The virtue of the
dissidents was their faith in the capacity of interaction within a modem civil society to give rise to authentic private and public structures.
The next part examines the difficulties of realizing this goal after the
83
change from communism to democracy in Eastern Europe.
III.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND CHANGE OF REGIME

Examination of the approach to civil society by the American and
French Revolutions highlights the problematic and delicate position of
post-communist civil society. Against that theoretical background,
this part explains the development of the current crisis of civil society
in the post-communist world. Part III.A explains that the debilitated
state of civil society stems from the State's accrual of a near-monopoly
on all resources over the past four decades, historical circumstances
prior to the rise of communism, and the contemporary irrelevance of
many traditional value systems that were suppressed and failed to
evolve during the communist era. Part III.B then identifies three normative categories that characterize the crises of East European civil
societies that have arisen amidst the circumstances described in III.A.
spired by support for a local Czechoslovakian band that would play the dissonant and searing
music heard on the American album WHITE LIGHT/WHITE HEAT:

You could see a university professor in friendly talk with a former member of the
Praesidium of the Communist Party and with a long-haired rock musician, and all of them
surrounded by police.
This was a sign of the things to come, of the special character or nature of the Charter
77, which united many people of different backgrounds and different views .... [Niow
members of the Charter 77 are deputies in Parliament, members of the government, or here
in the castle [where the President and his staff work] .... By this I mean to say that music,
underground music, in particular one record [WHITE LIGHT/WHITE HEAT] by a band
called Velvet Underground played a rather significant role in the development in our country, and I don't think that many people in the United States have noticed this.
Lou REED, BETWEEN THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION 151-52 (1991) (interviewing Havel). The
music of the Velvet Underground, unlike most music in the 1960s, imposed no ideological
message and is best characterized as an attempt to emulate the attitude of the free jazz projects of
Ornette Coleman, such as THIS IS OUR MUSIC.
81. See, e.g., JAN URBAN, HANNOVER ADDRESS (New School for Social Research, The East
& Central Europe Program Democracy Seminar Working Paper Series No. 1, 1990) (explaining
that dissidents considered their "tribe" to be free European society).
82. BRODSKY, supra note 39, at 171.
83. The exchange of Communist Party rule for democratic elections does not fulfill the civil
society goals of the dissidents. Part II has outlined the civil society goals of the transition, rather
than the factors that brought on the transition. It is arguable that international and economic
factors, as well as forces within the Communist Party, had as much to do with the demise of
Communism, as did the renewed vivacity of civil society in the late 1980's.
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Although a more scientific analysis could reveal tremendous differences among East European societies, there is evidence that post-communist civil societies are currently plagued, to varying degrees, with:
(1) elitism and an absence of institutional vehicles for societal forces,
(2) the legacy of learned helplessness, and (3) unchecked, revolutionary special interest groups.
A. Synthesizing the American and French Revolutions
Jiirgen Habermas's contrast between the American and French
Revolutions provides a useful framework for understanding the societal difficulties presented by transitions from communism in Eastern
Europe. Under the French Revolution model, the new State provides
"the organizational means for the construction of a total order of society."' 8 4 Habermas explains that the drive by a new State "to install a
technically correct system of institutions" stems from the foundation
of the regime change, as was the case in the French Revolution, in a
totalistic philosophical vision of a "correct social order." 85 The
French Revolution was driven by a desire to have the State mobilize
moral incentives.8 6 This clearly is not the case in Eastern Europe,
where radical autonomy or mobilization from below characterizes the
aspirations of many. More generally, those living in the midst of a
failed utopia have little interest in the totalizing visions of
revolutionaries.

87

Habermas's description of the American Revolution's approach to
civil society appears, at first glance, to fit post-communist tastes more
readily. The American Revolution was not a movement to empower
the State to realize a philosophical vision of how to organize the "total
society."' 8 8 Instead, the American Revolution appealed to already-existing sentiments or "common sense" in its approach to civil society.
The American Revolution approached the private sector with deference. Property rights, slavery, and other institutions were left un84. JORGEN HABERMAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE 91 (John Viertel trans., 1973).
85. Id. at 93.
86. Id. at 104-05.
87. Although post-communist society may not fill its "ideological and emotional vacuum"
with a new utopian vision, there are signs that society is turning towards extremist, counterrevolutionary pathologies like the quest for revolutionary justice. See Jeri Laber, Witch Hunt in
Prague, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKs, Apr. 23, 1992, at 5. Such movements do not affirm values or
contain a vision for a brighter future, but attempt to define society by opposition and by focus on
backward-looking criteria.
88. HABERMAS, supra note 84, at 94 ("this revolution has nothing to do with the political act
of realizing Natural Law, in the sense of constructing a constitution which organizes the total
society") (paraphrasing Thomas Paine).
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touched.8 9 Civil society was simply left as it was prior to the
Revolution. The American Revolution brought civil society closer to
the State by removing Britain's role in governance, but entailed no
drive to reform or rebuild civil society.
Despite post-communist civil society theory's affinity for the
American Revolution's "common sense" approach, the eighteenth
century American model is of limited use. After the American
Revolution, a no-reform policy made sense, because resources were
already in the possession of "common sense" institutions. In contrast,
the post-communist States have a virtual monopoly on all resources.
Some type of affirmative State reforms of society are necessary for civil
society to function with any power in the post-communist world. 90
Moreover, the post-communist State cannot simply transfer resources to traditional civil society institutions or privatize resources in
accordance with "common sense," because authentic institutions and
a traditional local "common sense" are not readily identifiable. Vajda
recounts how, despite the existence of kernels of civil society throughout the communist era, there actually have never been strong institutions independent of the State in Eastern Europe. 91 Strong,
centralized, State power has usually been a necessity in the region due
to the constant invasions, competition, and threats from Turkey, Russia, and Germany. Despite the professions of affinity for civil society
by anti-communists, it is a sad, historical fact that Eastern Europe
possesses few traditional structures with strong grass-roots foundations. As social scientist Claus Offe puts it, the post-communist world
is an "associational wasteland."' 92 The emphasis, during the transitions and in the underlying civil society theory, was upon personal
morality as opposed to group identities. That emphasis reflects the
absence of distinct collective identities and forces. In addition, the institutions that do exist have little experience actually participating in a
democratic polis, because political democracies in the region have only
89. See Stephen Holmes, Gag-rules or the Politics of Omission, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
DEMOCRACY 19, supra note 20. Of course, the American Revolution marked the dissolution of
monarchical social dependencies.
90. Vajda, supra note 73, at 348 (warning that the adoption of political democracy in the
communist world will not ensure social autonomy).
91. Id. at 343 (civil society has never been able "to gain more than a limited measure of social
autonomy").
92. Claus Offe, Strong Causes, Weak Cures I E. EUR. CONST. REV. 21, 23 (1992). Although
I agree with Professor Offe's characterization, I do not buy into the "myth of 'starting from
scratch' " after the demise of communism. See Stark, Path Dependence, supra note 4, at 20.
Although there is an institutional vacuum, I recognize that there are "institutional legacies of the
transitions." Id.; see infra part IH.B (discussing the post-communist political parties, peasant
movements, international investor groups, the Church, and other currently powerful civil society
institutions, which either lack deep roots among citizens or exercise power disproportionately).
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existed sporadically. 93
A quick glance at the newspapers reveals exceptions in the form of
recently resurrected ultra-nationalist, ethnic, and religious identities.
But those in the forefront of such collective identities are often demagogues exploiting the mere shell of an antiquated identity which failed
to evolve during the communist era. Although there are notable variations, many of the ethnic, religious, nationalist, and minority move-

ments in the post-communist world are not manifestations of the
contemporary relevance to society of traditional value systems. Instead they are mostly examples of old labels being abused by desperate
individuals to define themselves in opposition to others rather than
94
unto themselves through affirmative values.

If autonomous and dynamic civil societies are to arise and contribute to the future directions of their countries, then post-communist

States will have to synthesize the models of the French and American
Revolutions. As in the French model, the State must mobilize civil
society. As in the American model, the State must limit itself in defer-

ence to what exists prior to the State action. Accordingly, the challenges of the change in Eastern Europe give rise markedly to the input
and output issues of modern civil society. 95 The danger of State action
co-opting civil society is at a zenith, because a major State role is inevitable, given the current distribution of resources and otherwise debili93. Vajda, supra note 73, at 359. In Poland, the Solidarity union and the Catholic Church
had appeared during the 1980s to be promising institutions for a post-communist civil society.
However, after the collapse of communism, it appeared that the support during the 1980s for
those and other organizations had been more of a product of opposition to communism than an
affirmation of the values of those institutions. Wiktor Osiatynski, an expert advisor to the Polish
Senate on constitutional reform, keenly observes:
Ever since the early 1980s, a majority of scholars and observers agreed that a crucial
agent of change in Poland would be the emerging 'civil society.'...
The developments in Poland disproved this hopeful conclusion. By mid-1990, the civil
society, instead of being a solid foundational structure, was merely a set of strategies and
instruments to countervail the power of the communist system ....
With the end of communism, . . . [t]he civil society began to disintegrate.

Osiatynski, supra note 8, at 855-56.
94. Claus Offe's study of "ethnification" and nationalism in the post-communist world offers
explanations for this recent trend. Six of his explanations indicate the lack of a relation between
this trend and the contemporary relevance of ethnic and nationalist values: (1) as a means to
distinguish themselves from the prior regime, (2) as a "keep what we have" reaction to economic
panic, (3) as a means for engaging in violence in light of the weakness of the State, (4) as a
backward-looking, nostalgic response to cynicism about any forward-looking ideals, (5) as part of
"the logic that 'what they are doing to our people we are entitled to do to their people,'" (6) as a
reaction to the rediscovery of the history, suppressed by the prior regimes, of the atrocities committed by opposing ethnic groups. Offe, supra note 92, at 22-23.
Offe provides two reasons
which hint that this trend may be a result of the contemporary relevance of old value systems:
(1) the strategic value of pooling resources and (2) the need for social guidance. But he concludes that ethnification and nationalism are playing such roles solely because they are the only
associations readily available, rather than because they stand for popular values. Id. at 23.
95. See supra Part I and beginning of Part II.
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tated condition of civil society. The opportunities for grass roots
control over State output may also be at a zenith, because the dominant public and pseudo-civil society hierarchies of the past four decades have been destabilized.
B.

The Development of Post-Communist Civil Society
1. 1989: The Early Days

The dissident movement succeeded at showing that not all functional civil society institutions are necessarily facilitated by the State.
By the 1980's, the artificiality of Marxist-Leninist institutions' authority was clear, even though such institutions continued to retain officially most of society's strategic positions.96 Beneath the camouflage
of societal compliance with communism, there existed underground
initiatives such as samizdat publications, jazz and rock bands, philosophy lectures, filmmaking, and religious teaching.
As the official bans on societal pluralism disappeared during the
days of change in 1989, these authentic manifestations of civil society
surfaced, if they had not done so already, and flourished. Public matters were discussed by non-State associations. Dissident groups,
whose names indicated that they sought to function as civil society
associations, rather than as instruments of the State-co-opted political
system, emerged as representatives of sectors of the public at roundtable negotiations for political change. Such groups included the Civic
Forum in Czechoslovakia; the Democratic Forum and the Alliances of
Young Democrats and Free Democrats in Hungary; and the Citizens'
97
Parliamentary Club in Poland.
In addition, private interests flourished free of economic domination. Englishman Timothy Garton Ash recalls nostalgically how 1989
in Eastern Europe was a time of "family life, time and space for serious conversation, music, literature, not disturbed by the perpetual
noise of our media-driven and obsessively telecommunicative
world." 98 Ash concludes his eyewitness account of 1989 in Eastern
Europe with "the question of questions after 1989... : What if any of
these good things will survive liberation?" 99
96. See supra note 2 (defining "strategic position").
97. In Romania there was the Civic Alliance. Unfortunately, civil society theory did not
have a widespread effect in Romania and the majority of the populace felt more comfortable
associating itself with the National Salvation Front, a group which, as its name implies, sought to
bring about change "from above." The consequence of having a national savior lead the change
is State action to stabilize the savior's political power in the style of the communist party, rather
than the fostering of diverse grass roots organizations.
98. ASH, supra note 73, at 154.
99. Id. at 154.
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What's Wrong With This Picture?: The Crisis of PostCommunist Civil Society

Today a visitor to Eastern Europe can find many interesting signs
of "progress." Structured political parties take part in ruling and opposition coalitions. Most major cities have at least one McDonald's,
which is usually located in a historic locale. MTV is broadcast in public squares and available in most homes. The Pope has traveled to
most post-communist countries and been honored with commemorative postage stamps, tributes from political leaders, and the return of
Church property. International investors, the Church, and independent political parties are all examples of civil society. So what is
wrong with this picture?
a.

Elitism and the Absence of Authentic Institutions

In Eastern Europe there is a simultaneous underdevelopment and
hyperdevelopment of post-communist civil society. The result is a
"general crisis of civility." t° ° Many of the dissident associations
which identified themselves as vehicles of civil society have moved into
positions of political power. However, their authenticity is questionable. The shift to multiparty democracy may have been too sudden.
Sociologists David Stark and Liszl6 Bruszt observe that the new parties' "one-step uncompromised jump-start into electoral competition
01
...was not conducive to sinking deep roots into the society."'
Janos
Kis, a leading dissident philosopher who resigned in October 1991
from his position as the President of Hungary's Alliance of Free Democrats, comments that much of the public now feels locked out as they
10 2
watch these groups of elites engage in pet projects.
Evidence that Stark, Bruszt, and Kis are correct is provided by the
sharp drop in voter turnout. Much of the initial popularity of the
main opposition parties was probably based on "the sheer novelty" of
100. Havel, supra note 3, at 6.
101. LASZL6 BRUSZT & DAVID

STARK, REMAKING THE POLITICAL FIELD IN HUNGARY:
FROM THE POLITICS OF CONFRONTATION TO THE POLITICS OF COMPETITION 46-47, (Cornell

Project on Comparative Institutional Analysis Working Papers on Transitions from State Socialism No. 9, 1991). The Bruszt & Stark article is an analysis of Hungary, rather than of the entire
region.
102. Janos Kis, Social Democracy in Hungary (Oct., 1991) (unpublished paper delivered as
part of The New School for Social Research's Democracy Seminar Series, New York, NY) (on
file with the Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw). For similar comments on the first Polish
post-communist government, see Osiatynski, supra note 8, at 857 ("The only thing that the intelligentsia-dominated government and Parliament neglected was to communicate with the society.
They claimed to rule 'for the people,' but they definitely did not rule 'by the people' or 'through
the people.' In private conversations, some deputies to Parliament and members of the government expressed contempt toward ordinary people.").
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their existence 10 3 and the necessity of appearances of unity to defeat
communism. 1°4 The fact that Stanislaw Tyminski, a relatively unknown expatriate who was unassociated with a major domestic political group, could quickly rise in popularity to receive twenty-one
percent of the presidential vote in Poland is another sign that the new
parties, which put themselves forward as vehicles of civil society, actually have tenuous connections with society. 105 Further support for the
thesis that the original post-communist parties do not have foundations in civil society is the fractionalization of many of the 1989-90
political parties, in the year following the first elections, in Poland,

Czechoslovokia, and Hungary.

06

The problem with the empowerment of elites in the new democracies is that the source of power is not the dynamism of civil society,
but the system itself. One sociology commentator has even suggested
that awareness of the probability that newly legalized opposition parties would assume the role of new elites, which "channel politics away
from the ebullience of civil society"'' 0 7 in order to stabilize themselves,'0 8 may have been the reason why the communists invited those
parties to the negotiating table. 109 This suggestion borrows from an
103. O'DONNELL & SCHMITTER, supra note 71, at 48-56 (explaining sudden popularity of
new, independent political organizations when a totalitarian regime changes to a multiparty
system).
104. See Klingsberg, Judicial Review, supra note 4, at 131-32 (cooperation against communism was the unifying "movement of nationwide scope") (citing Andris Boz6ki, Hungary's Road
to Systemic Change: The Opposition Roundtable 19-20 (unpublished manuscript, Law School,
E6tv6s Lorind University (Budapest), J6zsef B6r6cz trans., 1991) (manuscript on file with the
Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw)); see also ASH, supra note 73, at 146 (discussing the
quick change from unity to factionalism once communists were out of power).
George Soros recently stopped funding Charta 77, the original Czechoslovakian dissident
organization, because it had failed to emerge as "an institution of civil society." Soros Resigns
from Charta 77 Board, 3 OPEN SOC'Y: CHRON. OF THE SOROS FOUND. 3 (Mar., 1992). See also
supra note 93 (discussing Poland).
105. Kis, supra note 102. Kis also points out that there is no traditional family association
with the new political parties, as there is for instance in Germany. Id.
106. See Stephen Engelberg, In Polish Vote a Clear Slap at Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
1991, at A3 (discussing splintering of parties); Laber, supra note 87 (on split up of Public Against
Violence in CSFR). In Hungary, the Smallholders have split into two factions and dissension
within the MDF is common. As for the Alliance of Free Democrats, the leader of the party since
its inception resigned in October 1991.
107. ANDREW ARATO, REVOLUTION, CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY 19 (Cornell Project on Comparative Institutional Analysis, Working Papers on Transitions from State Socialism,
No. 90.5, 1990) (quoting O'DONNELL & SCHMITTER, supra note 71, at 57-58).
108. See generally, ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF
THE OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1962).

109. ARATO, supra note 107, at 19, 22. Nevertheless, in this working paper, Arato is much
more optimistic about the potential for post-communist dissident associations-cum-political parties to foster and embody civil society, through ties to social movements, than he is about the
potential for political parties in the West. Id.; see also BRUSZT & STARK, supra note 101 (discussing "attempt by (renamed) communist/socialist leaders to take advantage of the perceived weakness of civil society").
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observation made by analysts of Latin American transitions from totalitarian control. Those analysts point out that ruling elites suddenly
permit quick elections and risk abolition of their rule, because these
old elites seek to empower new elites and thereby stunt social change
and the full development of a dynamic civil society.'"t
Havel notes that Czechoslovakian parties assume a manipulative
approach to the public, rather than serving or responding to the public. "II This was also the basis for his critique of the communist discontinuity with civil society. In 1984, Havel accused the communists of
following the "theory of politics as a rational technology of power." '" 2
Politicians must rely on technique when they have no substantive
grass roots.
Another significant indication of the crisis of civil society in postcommunist nations is the discontinuity between the language of the
parties in power and the language used by private individuals to communicate meaningfully in a public setting. In recent essays, both
Havel and the Vice-president of Bulgaria note how the language of
politics in post-communist Europe is dominated by hyberbole, meaningless Western expressions, and cliches that are not found in common
speech. I'I Havel points out that even "when a personal tone does crop
up, it is usually calculated, not an outburst of personal authenticity.""14 The Vice-president of Bulgaria calls the terminology of the
new politics "anti-language, '""1 5 or language imposed from above in an
effort to stabilize society. By contrast, the political use of the language
of authentic civil society would reflect the empowerment of civil society's dynamism.
Similarly, the media has become a vehicle for stability rather than
for empowerment of civil society. Prague's Radio Stalin and Budapest's Tilos Radio each arose as popular "pirate" radio stations during
the early days of post-communism. Domestic communications enthusiasts sent diverse local and non-commercial music and messages
across the airwaves. However, bureaucrats shut down both stations.
In addition, performances by local musicians have been virtually elim110. O'DONNELL & SCHMITT'ER, supra note 71, at 57-58; Osiatynski, supra note 8, at 856
("It turned out to be impossible to sustain a Polish form of civil society (a bulwark against the
State) with the very same people who became a part of the State.").
Il1. Viclav Havel, The End of the Modern Era, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1992, § 4 at 15 ("technocratic ... approach ... to political power"). See also supra note 93 (discussing Poland).

112. Havel, supra note 40, at 387.
113. Blaga Dimitrova, The New Newspeak, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 5, 1992, at 18; Havel,
supra note 3.
114. Havel, supra note I11.
115. Dimitrova, supra note 113.
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inated from Hungarian television in favor of foreign videos (prompting
a rally in Budapest).
In October 1990, the state-run media also attempted to suppress a
sudden manifestation of civil society in Budapest: the taxi and truck
drivers went on strike in response to an increase in gasoline prices.
The response to this independently organized event revealed the
problems confronting the development of civil society. Representatives of Prime Minister Josef Antall's Democratic Forum (MDF) sat
in the television news studios controlling all of the initial reports on
the strike and sent out the message that the use of force against the
strikers was imminent.' 16 Nevertheless, the MDF's efforts to use State
resources to suppress, rather than to incorporate, the dynamism of
civil society failed. The MDF could not censor the strikers' message,
because, in response to a demand of the strikers, the televison and
radio media provided live coverage of the government negotiations
with the strikers. In addition the police chief announced publicly that
he would not order his officers to engage in violent suppression of the
drivers' expressive activity.
Further evidence, however, of the uncertainty of civil society characterized the Ocotber 1990 strike. A plethora of organizations took
part in the strike negotiations. Representatives from opposition and
ruling political parties, official unions, unofficial unions, and token
drivers were all present. Exactly who was the authentic institutional
representative of the strikers was not known, so it was best to just let
as many groups as possible sit at the negotiating table. If there had
been an established civil society institution to communicate the concerns of the drivers, then those concerns could have been considered
prior to the strike. More importantly, an established civil society institution could have effectively protested, and negotiated a reduction in,
the price hike in a manner more contained and directed than this inefficient, disruptive strike action and emergency negotiating session.
The drivers felt compelled to close access for three days to all bridges,
borders, main squares, and airports, and to involve nearly every official in tense negotiations - in which the destiny of the country appeard to be at stake - simply to work out the narrow issue of gasoline
prices.
In sum, two manifestations of the crisis of civil society emerged
116. The MDF's exploitation of the state-dominated media was probably not limited to its
actions during the taxi strike. Prime Minister Antall has sought to appoint exclusively MDF
loyalists to key positions at the television and radio stations.
In Romania, the government's domination of resources for the preparation of newspapers
also has been exploited to limit the dynamism of civil society. See John London, Freedom Within
Limits: The New Media, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Aug. 1990, at 27.
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from the strike: (1) the drivers almost did not have an institution
through which to express their concerns; and (2) the government
nearly prevented the drivers from expressing their concerns through
ad hoc institutions. These characteristics of the civil society crisis take
on particular significance now, when the economy is in poor condition.
During difficult economic times, group interests require opportunities
to communicate their special needs. Bruszt and Stark conclude that
the crisis of civil society places the entire economic transition from
communism at risk:
[T]his almost totalizing supremacy of party politics finds the society unorganized and still lacking intermediary forms of political organization
such as trade unions, corporatist institutions, or broad social
movements ....
[I]t may well ... be the case that no one will be able to gain society's
support for the government's economic policies....
..[T]he absence of organizational ties into the society means that [the
State] has neither the means to know the limits of society's tolerance nor
the channels to persuade it to make those sacrifices....
[T]he Polish and Hungarian cases might yet demonstrate that vital
[..
trade unions not only mobilize but also demobilize and that the transition from17 redistribution to markets will be more difficult in their
absence. '
b.

The Legacy of Learned Helplessness

The source of the crisis is not solely the conduct of the new elites.
The problem lies with citizen perpetuation of a syndrome of learned
helplessness. "[E]ven now, when so many words have been said about
freedom, a lot of people still feel uncomfortable with it-with the opportunities it presents." 1 8 Individuals hesitate to step forward to
build institutions which can embody their autonomous beliefs. Many
individuals are simply disaffected and fearful that any attempt to assert and to institutionalize personal ideals will foster and manifest
their alienation from society, rather than their capacity to participate.
A vivid example is the hesitation of large segments of Eastern European Jewry to come out of the closet and incorporate their Jewish
identity into their participation in the post-communist world. Another example is the enthusiasm for anti-communist or revolutionary
justice movements, as opposed to fervor for the affirmation of any forward-looking beliefs. After four decades of communism, anything
that requires an affirmation of belief is seen as propaganda. It is pref117. BRUSZT & STARK, supra note 101, at 47.
118. Dirnitrov, supra note 3.
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erable to look backward and define oneself in opposition.'t
c.

9

Unchecked Special Interests

Another problem that stems from the commencement of political
democracy in the midst of an underdeveloped civil society is that those
autonomous social forces that have organized receive a disproportionate share of private resources from the State. The State is co-opting
these minority but organized forces into clientele at the expense of
enabling the rest of civil society to develop. The civil society group
that most readily organized itself and set forth its interests was the
peasant farmers.120 In each post-communist country there is a minority group whose sole goal is to put as much State property into the
hands of the peasants as possible. Of course, the peasants are not the
only individuals in Eastern Europe who desperately need entitlements
to State property. These groups act as if the defeat of communism was
the peasants' revolution. Other groups with similar outlooks on privatization are the select international investor funds, which often expect
that they will be entitled to buy and do what they wish with any State
property for which they can submit the highest bid, and the Church,
which expects to receive entitlements to just about all property it ever
controlled including educational institutions. The nurturing of "genuine private initiatives"' 12' has not emerged as privatization's underlying premise. Instead, those in politics use privatization to "buy
grateful and loyal adherents."'' 22 Accordingly, post-communist States
have limited those who have been able to obtain rights to State prop119. See BRODSKY, supra note 39, at 7 (. . . looking backward is more rewarding than its
opposite. Tomorrow is just less attractive than yesterday. For some reason, the past doesn't
radiate such immense monotony as the future does ....
the future is propaganda."). See also
Laber, supra note 87 (explaining that the current dearth of civil society institutions in Czechoslovakia, as a legacy of the unique brutality of the communist regime there, has left an "ideological
and emotional vacuum" which is responsible for that country's penchant for revolutionary jus-

tice, as embodied in the lustrace. Meanwhile, Poland and Hungary had relatively more welldeveloped civil society institutions under communism and therefore are now less prone towards
revolutionary justice witch hunts).

120. See, e.g., ASH, supra note 73, at 146 (observing how peasant farmers quickly emerged as
"the most distinctive and determined group" and would ignore party lines to "conspir[e] to

advance their sectional interests").
121. Major, supra note 4.

122. Id. In particular, Major relates a scam to channel shares for certain State properties
into select hands. Major implies that these problems might be resolved by a shift from privatization run by a central organ, like Hungary's State Property Agency, to the decentralized system of

spontaneous privatization, in which purchasers can negotiate sales directly with the managers of
State businesses and factories. Id. There are actually many choices in structuring a privatization
system. Professor David Stark's analysis of Hungarian privatization describes several of the
dimensions: foreign v. domestic ownership; spontaneous v. controlled; institutional v. natural
owners; concentrated v. dispersed ownership. See STARK, PRIVATIZATION IN HUNGARY, supra

note 4. The choice of a particular organizational system will not solve the crisis of civil society.
For instance, faith in the capacity of a switch to spontaneous privatization oversimplifies the
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erty (except for very small restaurant operations) to peasants, certain
international investors, and the Church. 2 3 Yet, there is no indication
that these groups have any more merit than other less developed
groups in civil society.
The domination of these special interests is problematic because (1)
those with competing interests are not yet organized, and (2) the creation of State clientele during these first years of post-communism will
have lasting effects on civil society because the economically empowered are now being created through the transfer of State resources to
private hands. The warped empowerment of certain sectors of civil
society would result in economic and political hierarchies that could
stunt the grand dialogue of modern civil society1 24 for years to come.
The stunting of civil society, by the factors described in this part, is
more dangerous now than it was under communism. If large sectors
of the populace are locked out of the new public and private hierarchies and therefore become disillusioned with democracy, then the
next regime may well be a form of populist authoritarianism. The ambitions of those who would like to co-opt the transition to democracy
for their own benefit could bring on "the deadly merry-go-round of
1 25
revolution and counter revolution."'

IV.

THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE REBUILDING OF
CIVIL SOCIETY

The limitation of the State in order to ensure the empowerment of
civil society is a traditional role for constitutionalism. In a recent historical analysis, Akhil Reed Amar points out that an original purpose
of the U.S. Bill of Rights was the protection of the existence of "various intermediate associations-church, militia, and jury--designated
to create an educated and virtuous electorate."1 2 6 A theme of Amar's
study is that the Framers sought to have rights facilitate the development of societal institutions that ensure that "the real direction of socidelicacy and depth of consideration that is necessary for structuring privatization to empower a
dynamic, modem civil society. See infra Part IV.
Other disproportionately powerful civil society groups are the Polish Workers Councils, "one
of the most important institutional legacies in the economic realm of Poland's extrication from
state socialism," Stark, Path Dependence, supra note 4, at 41 n.45; and the Hungarian State

enterprise managers, "the best-organized social group during the previous decade." Id. at 49.
For discussions of how those groups have attempted to make themselves the locus of the privatization process, see id. at 41 n.45, 49, 51.
123. But cf supra note 4 (discussing "mass privatization" plans for sales of certain large
state-owned companies).
124. See supra Part I.
125. Havel, supra note 3, at 6; see also Kis, supra note 102.
126. Amar, supra note 15, at 1132.
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ety [is] in the hands of the governed, . . . and not in that of the
government."' 127 This part argues that the generation of such a rights
jurisprudence is post-communist constitutionalism's challenge for the
future. First I will illustrate how a post-communist constitutional
court can enforce constitutional rights to ensure that privatization decisions protect civil society. After an explanation of why such review
would not place post-communist judiciaries in an overreaching position, I will discuss analogous instances of judicial review in the United
States. Finally, I will comment on why post-communist courts should
avoid certain concerns underlying the decisions in the analogous U. S.
cases.
A.

ConstitutionalReview of Privatization and Transformation

One lesson from the downfall of Marxism-Leninism is that political stability founded upon state-created clientele has its limits. Even
if a regime has military force and access to all of society's property on
its side, stability cannot be guaranteed if the State insists on steering
and penetrating, rather than creating space for the empowerment of,
authentic civil society. Civil society has a power unto itself. Even the
most determined paternalistic efforts to channel authentic civil society
into "innocuous outlets," as Kadar did in the last decades of Hungarian Communism,12 are subject to failure.
This lesson from the downfall of Marxism-Leninism has implications for those who would like to apply currently the prudence often
attributed to the democratic visions of de Tocqueville and Madison.
De Tocqueville and Madison argued that democracy could only exist
with stability if unaccompanied by any quest for equality of property
and other strategic resources. 129 It was fair to make such an argument
in the eighteenth century because at that time inequalities within civil
society, including the complete non-recognition of certain sectors, had
strong foundations in tradition. In the modern era, the selective suppression or neglect of institutions and sectors of civil society no longer
can function to stabilize a regime. Traditional lines between those
worthy of a voice and other resources, and those whose neglect must
be accepted for the sake of stability, have faded. A political system
that discriminatorily empowers certain sectors of civil society faces instability and risks losing its legitimacy in the modern world. A regime
127. Id. at 1185 (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 293-94
(Vintage ed., 1945)).
128. Vajda, supra note 73, at 356.
129. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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must embrace dynamism to be stable.1 30 This means coordinating

State action and inaction so that the State does not foster the status
quo suppression of authentic voices.
The mission of the post-communist State is to provide citizens with
resources for the development and manifestation of their cognitive and
moral competencies,' 3 ' rather than to dictate the direction of the future in a paternalistic fashion, as certain special interests would prefer.
Privatization must provide the resources for the institutional structures necessary for this mission. If civil society were naturally thriving
and the only role for the State was to mold public space so that each
group interest could participate, then the task would not be so diffiCult.132 The problem extends beyond simply permitting preexisting societal groups to participate. Those societal groups need to form.
What is needed in this socially devastated region is not only a "more
realized State," as Hegel described a State that incorporated input
from more sectors of society, but also a more realized civil society.
The circumstances described in Part III call for a new kind of victory. Arato and Cohen elaborate: "victory is no longer seen as the
inclusion in state power (reform) or in smashing the state (revolution)
but, among the most reflective segments of the movements, as the rebuilding of civil society and the controlling of the market economy
33
and the bureaucratic state."'
The vehicle for ensuring "an adequately defended, differentiated,
and organized civil society"' 3 4 is constitutional law. Post-communist
constitutionalism should function not as a State master plan, but as a
restriction upon privatization like Havel's "Absolute."' 35 Constitutionalism should seek to prohibit the State from structuring the transformation from communism in a manner that prevents authentic
strivings from flourishing. The State should not favor a specific truth,
but let truths live and thrive.
A mode for enforcement of constitutional law is review of State
action by an independent constitutional court, which is insulated from
the need to establish a clientele base among special interest groups. I
advocate that such courts review all State decisions on private access
to the vast range of resources currently within the control of the State.
130. Cf.MEISTER, supra note 17, at 149-50.
131. Arato & Cohen, supra note 9, at 47.
132. See, e.g.,
Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term: Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV L. REV. 1 (1979).
133. Arato & Cohen, supra note 9, at 59.
134. Id.
135. See supra Part II.
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These privatization decisions occur by sale, by state-created entitlement, as well as by restrictions, such as the shutting down of a pirate
radio station. The purpose of the constitutional review would be to
determine when the state action is empowering civil society and when
the action is a discriminatory suppression of autonomy within civil
society and therefore must be limited in some manner. Infringement
upon or discriminatory neglect of a civil right signals that State action
is suppressing civil society. While courts must defer to police power
concerns like health and safety, the roots of the executives and legislatures in a developed civil and political society are too shallow for postcommunist constitutional review to adopt deferential post-Lochner
scrutiny of government rationales. When the State action suppresses
autonomy within civil society, the judiciary must enforce those constitutional rights-whether they be free speech, environmental, or liberty
rights-that the State has neglected in its effort to favor a particular
client.
Hungary has the benefit of an insightful Constitutional Court that
is well suited for such an undertaking. Indeed, the Court has already
enforced this type of constitutionalism on several occasions. Constitutional courts in other countries could play similar roles. The Hungarian Court's Land Act Cases struck down, pursuant to the equal
protection clause, attempts by Parliament to distribute selectively
State property to peasants.' 36 The Court also is considering whether
to strike down legislation which entitles the Catholic Church to large
amounts of State property, which otherwise could be used by educational institutions, student organizations, and other civil society
groups. 137 The invalidated enactments would have served as revolutionary instruments of discrimination and ultimately suppression.
Equal protection requires that the State privatize resources in a manner that permits the institutionalization not only of one religion, but of
all other identities.
Ecological rights-recognized in the draft Czech and Slovak Constitutions, as well as in the adopted Hungarian and Bulgarian Constitutions-should require courts to review privatization sales of
polluters to protect those living in blackened wastelands near manufacturing plants. The argument that new investors will perceive environmental cleanup as in their best interests and therefore undertake
cleanup unilaterally does not apply to post-communist Europe. It will
136. See Klingsberg, JudicialReview, supra note 4, at 81-119, 138-41 (analyzing the Land
Act Cases thoroughly). The most recent Land Act Case, published in May 1992, allowed for
discriminatory distributions and strayed from the strong ruling in Land Act Case 1.
137. Id. at 139 & n.254.
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be many more years before market forces will dictate to a private investor that environmental cleanup is his or her responsibility, because
post-communist Europe is far from becoming a free market. As a result of administrative and other problems, in over two years only ten
to fifteen percent of the property has been privatized. 138 The State
must either mandate the inclusion of a commitment to an environmental cleanup plan as a part of all purchases of State property or include
the cost of such a plan in the sale price.' 39 In this way, the State is
privatizing not only a business, but also responsibility for the environment. A constitutional court should mandate such action by the State
when reviewing the constitutionality of the privatization of a company
that pollutes. If a court does not review the privatization of polluters
in such a manner, then it will be neglecting citizens' environmental
rights.
Perhaps the most delicate area of privatization is communications.
This area is crucial to the functioning of modern civil society's grand
dialogue.140 The language that rules the day should be the product of
debate among civil society, not newspeak invented by politicians. Accordingly, conduct like that of the MDF in the newsroom during the
taxi strike 14 1 must be constitutionally enjoined under free speech
rights, as should the bureaucratic decisions to shut down pirate radio
initiatives without a compelling police power justification. Furthermore, courts must recognize that post-communist State action can infringe on free speech rights not only by direct restrictions, but also by
discriminatory privatization of media outlets and other scarce resources strategic to communication. In addition, until the major political parties are better rooted in society, constitutional courts should
invoke free speech rights to invalidate campaign financing laws that
fail to fund a wide range of parties.
Constitutions must also protect the new domestic capitalists from
restrictive regulation. This "amorphous social and political category"' 142 sells goods in metro stations and parking lots, and offers serv138. See supra note 4.

139. For discussions of State attempts to accomodate environmental concerns in the privatization process, see Marlise Simons, Pollution Blights Investment Too, in East Europe, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 1992, at Al, A12 (discussing privatization plan in which the Polish government

and the investor set up a separate escrow account to fund the environmental cleanup); see generally Margaret Bowman & David Hunter, Environmental Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe:

From High Hopes to Hard Reality, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 929.
140. See supra Part I.
141. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
142. EDMUND MOKRZYCKI, THE SOCIAL LIMITS OF EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REFORMS
II (New School for Social Research East & Central Europe Program Democracy Seminar Working Paper Series, 1991).

Summer 1992]

Rebuilding Civil Society

ices like plumbing and carpentry through leaflets. Nearly all of the
participants in the economy have a vested interest in opposing the further development of such activities. Most economic actors perceive it
to be in their best interest to maintain the old system in which a stable
return was guaranteed for the inefficient production of low quality
goods. Therefore, as Edmund Mokrzycki observes, "social energy is
mobilizing itself to defend group interests that are a product of the
143
epoch of real socialism and are now threatened by the market."'
Consequently, the domestic free marketeers are often sneered at as
black marketeers and gypsies. But this vibrant sector must be welcomed into society, rather than suppressed. Technically, these smallscale free marketeers are still illegal in most post-communist countries.
But States have wisely refrained from restricting their sales. In Hungary, for instance, approximately thirty percent of the GNP stems
from such activity. 144 However, if Professor Mokrzycki's observation
is correct, efforts are underway to limit the growth of these genuine

private initiatives. The Constitution must protect rights to private
property and contractual liberty by carefully scrutinizing the rationality of future efforts to restrict such small-scale capitalist initiatives.
Constitutional oversight of the transformation of the State-dominated field of education is also necessary. Elementary education may
shift from the domain of the Communist Party to that of religious or
ultra-nationalist organizations. Free speech and liberty rights must
protect citizens from the suppression of ideas in the schools. In addition, civil society development depends on the invalidation of regulations that require a style of teaching that develops uncritical minds.
Under communism, faculties of law required students to memorize
lists of Code terminology and ideological cliches. Written and creative
143. Id.
Istvin R. Gkbor points out that in Hungary the new entrepreneurs also favor the entrenchment of the rules of the communist era. ISTVAN R. GABOR, ON THE IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS
FOR PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND RE-EMBOURGEOUISEMENT IN HUNGARY (Cornell Project on Comparative Institutional Analysis, Working Papers on Transitions from State Socialism
No. 90.3, 1990). The small-scale free marketeers prefer the role of black marketeers for many of
the same reasons that pimps favor the illegality of prostitution: to avoid taxation, regulation, and
competition. Gibor proposes that the way to win actors over to the free market is through State
coordination of private actors in each industry to ensure that nobody is left behind at the outset.
Even if Gfbor's proposals are not followed, the Constitution should protect the new "black market" entrepreneurs and thereby encourage others to follow that path. In Czechoslovakia, a sign
of resistance to the market economy is the lack of interest in mass privatization programs, which
present citizens with the opportunity to become "small active investors with an interest in the
ups and downs of the market." See Stark, Path Dependence, supra note 4, at 35 n.31 ("According to public opinion polls at the beginning of 1991, interest in participating in the voucherauction program [of Czechoslovakia] was very low."). However, domestic interest in
Czechozlovakian privatization increased dramatically in 1992.
144. Black Market Seen Contributing to Nation's Economic Recovery, I E. Eur. Rep. 153
(BNA) (Dec. 9, 1991).
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examinations were non-existent. The curriculum resembled a medieval catechism more than the training of active, critical minds that
would construct, lead, and reform the juridical world. There is currently a strong tendency to retain this antiquated approach through
the incorporation of new lists and cliches. If lawyers are to emerge as
active participants in a modem civil society, through membership in
bar associations and representation of a diversity of interests, then
they must be trained in an environment which fosters dialogue and
critical exchanges. Constitutional rights must protect unorthodox
teaching initiatives from falling prey to education ministry regulations
45
that would have civil society trained to suffocate itself.'
Constitutional law should also protect the legal profession from
rules that restrict its privatization. In the communist legal world, lawyers deferred to State investigations and prosecutions by never engaging in private investigations and only bringing civil actions after a
successful State prosecution. There remains a sense that an activist
lawyer who ignores these customs would somehow violate a code of
ethics or court rule.' 46 Some countries also restrict the capacity of
lawyers, who are admitted to the bar, to practice law independently of
officially designated State collectives. The legal profession must be
privatized or else civil society will be deprived of a useful resource. In
order to detect infringements on the liberty rights of lawyers and their
clients, constitutional courts should scrutinize the application of these
Soviet-style restrictions on private lawyers.
This proposal to have constitutional courts oversee these privatization processes may sound overreaching to a Western audience. But no
Western democracy has ever experienced the circumstances present in
post-communist countries. A transition from communism requires a
historic amount of action by a constitutional State and therefore
presents an unprecendented risk of misuse of State power. Not only is
there a great deal for the State to do, but each action is of major societal significance. Current privatization decisions will shape both the
145. One notable endeavor in this realm is an attempt to start a new law school in Olomouc,
Czechoslovakia. Last year, Western law professors and former dissidents put together a curricu-

lum for the Olomouc Faculty of Law which appeared radical and experimental in comparison
with other Czech and Slovak law schools, where lists were still being memorized.

Yet, the

Olomouc legal training program almost never got off the ground, because of staunch resistance
from the bureaucrats in charge of legal education. Only after an arduous struggle did the
Olomouc proposal receive State approval. Another unorthodox initiative is the Central European University. See GEORGE SOROS, UNDERWRITING DEMOCRACY 129 (1991). The Constitution of each nation should protect such initiatives.
146. Although when Professor George Fletcher pressed Hungarian lawyers to show him

such a rule, they could not. George Fletcher, Remarks at the Hungarian Ministry of Justice
Seminars (Jan., 1991).
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short- and long-term futures of post-communist societies. (In contrast, State attempts to mold society in the West will be of much more
limited effect, because traditional, propertied institutions of civil society are already established here.) In addition to the stakes being high,
the politicians and bureaucrats making the privatization decisions
have shallow roots in civil society. Finally, post-communist society is
too weak to check the political branches without the assistance of
rights enforcement by an independent judiciary.
B.

The Protection of Civil Society in United States Constitutional
Caselaw: Trends for Post-Communist Courts to Avoid

The distinction between privatization that creates autonomy and
privatization that suppresses autonomy is a delicate one. Every privatization to a certain extent increases one entity's autonomy and neglects to empower another entity, because the entitlement is being
created for only one entity. A jurisprudence of rights, however,
should be able to determine empirically when an entitlement is providing a strategic resource necessary for the fulfillment of a right and
when it is being made discriminatorily at the cost of suppressing another's unfulfilled right. The ensuing case analyses discuss a framework for making such a distinction.
The United States has never undergone a massive property right
redistribution and civil society rebuilding effort on the scale of the
post-communist privatization processes. Nevertheless, the federal and
state governments do redistribute property entitlements through welfare and tax laws. 147 Another type of State action in the United States,
analogous to privatization, is the creation of "rights of access" to forums for communication. A privatization is basically the creation of a
"right of access" to a resource to which the State had been entitled
formerly. The U.S. Supreme Court reviews the legal rules that deny
or create "rights of access" to determine whether the rules conflict
with rights to free speech. A review of caselaw in this area provides an
outline of the issues that the post-communist constitutional courts will
confront when determining whether privatization decisions conflict
with the right to free speech. In addition, the critical assessments that
follow point to controlling factors that post-communist constitutional
courts should avoid if they are to develop a rights jurisprudence that
protects civil society.
Challenges to the creation of a right of access to resources for com147. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT

DOMAIN (1985).
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munication generally assume a variation on the claim that the newly
created right violates free speech rights through discrimination against
the potential for other groups to contribute to an informative public
debate. The free speech rights at stake are those of either the listeners,
the speakers, or both. For example, in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 48 a taxpayer activist group challenged a tax
provision which effectively "subsidize[d] the substantial lobbying activities of veterans' organizations,"' 49 but not the lobbying activities of
taxpayer activist groups. Similarly, in CBS v. Democratic National
Committee, 150 the Democratic National Committee (DNC) argued
against the constitutionality of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) rule that a television broadcaster could air its own views,
but refuse to air a DNC political advertisement which expressed contrary views. In each case the plaintiff challenged a legal rule, which
controlled the distribution of rights of access to resources for communication, for allegedly discriminating against free speech rights.
1. Backward-Looking Criteria and the Availability of Private
Sector Resources
In Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, the
Supreme Court ruled that a government subsidy for the speech of veterans groups did not require a subsidy for the taxpayer group. The
reason the Court found no conflict with a free speech right was because the neglect of the taxpayer group failed to result in the suppression of ideas. 5 ' What is strange about the Court's holding is that it
does not rest upon a finding that veterans' organizations need subsidization and that taxpayers' groups do not. The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, sitting en banc, had decided that the legislative discrimination had no rational basis.152 Then-Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, reversed that decision based upon his own
conclusory observations that the decision to refrain from subsidizing
taxpayer groups "is not irrational" and that the decision to subsidize
the veterans is justified because of veterans' past contributions to society.' 5 3 The majority never determined how much either group needed
the subsidy to function prospectively.
Post-communist legislatures may well create discriminatory enti148. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
149. Id. at 547.
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F.2d
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94 (1973).
at 548.
715 (1982), rev'd, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
at 550-51.
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tlements to State resources based upon the past, as the U.S. Congress
did in Regan. There are several civil society institutions in post-communist Europe that have been resurrected from pre-communist eras.
These groups, which are usually religious and peasant organizations,
exercise a disproportionate influence over legislatures due to their ability to exploit remnants of their old organizational structures. 5 4 The
justification for any discriminatory privatizations in their favor are the
contributions that they made in the past in comparison with other
more recently formed and equally needy groups. A post-communist
court following Justice Rehnquist's approach in Regan would have to
uphold a privatization that favored one of these resurrected
institutions.
The consequences of discriminatory entitlements based on past
acts, as opposed to forward-looking criteria, are significantly different
in the United States than in the post-communist world. In the United
States, the taxpayers' group might well be able to thrive without a
State subsidy as the result of the large amount of resources available in
the private sector. If post-communist courts approve the privatization
of communicative (and other) resources after such an analysis, then
they will fail to protect civil society from State suppression. In the
post-communist world, such a discriminatory entitlement would suppress the chance for new, contemporarily relevant civil society institutions to have any chance for development. Courts should determine
the effect of the regulation on the capacities of both the favored and
disfavored parties to convey their messages as participants in modern
civil society. The following critique of the CBS decision discusses further the type of analysis required to protect the free speech rights necessary for the development of civil society.
2.

Deference to the Status Quo

In CBS v. DNC, the Supreme Court again upheld the challenged
legal rule. The Court decided that the exclusion of the DNC from
advertising on the CBS network did not infringe on any free speech
rights. The Court compared the effect on free speech rights caused by
granting a right of access to the DNC with the effect on rights caused
by upholding the present rule which guaranteed CBS exclusive access.
That analysis of the legal rule's effect on public debate was more probing than the review in Regan, but just as misguided. First, the Court
found that the DNC's desired right of access would cause "erosion of
the journalistic discretion of broadcasters" and thereby infringe on the
154. See supra part III.B.2.c.

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 13:865

free speech rights of citizens to receive CBS's message. 55 At least the
Supreme Court here made an assessment of the rule's prospective effect on CBS's capacity to function as an autonomous institution in
society. In contrast, in Regan, the Court only examined the basis for
the veterans' groups' receipt of the entitlement through examination of
backward-looking criteria, which were irrelevant to the prospective
exercise of free speech rights.
The CBS decision falters when it turns to evaluation of the effect of
the FCC's rule on the DNC. The Court found that the exclusion of
the DNC's advertisement would cause no cognizable set-back to the
56
richness of public debate, because the fairness doctrine was in effect. 1
The fairness doctrine required "fair coverage" of "each side" of "public issues... presented on broadcast stations."' 5 7 Under this doctrine,
the DNC's message would be related in a manner and context over
which the DNC would have no control. A broadcaster's compliance
with the fairness doctrine could result in impairment of the DNC's
message rather than conveyance of that message. The fairness doctrine and the CBS decision completely ignored the signficance to the
DNC's message of circumstantial factors, such as the speaker's identity, the rhythm, and the metaphors, "that designate such matters as
relevance, propriety, regularity, [and] conviction."' 58 The Court refused to recognize the difference between the fairness doctrine's conveyance of representative views 159 and an advertisement's "special and
separate mode of expression.' 6° The scales showed that airing the
advertisement would infringe on CBS's contribution to public debate,
while providing for no additional contribution from the DNC. Accordingly, the Court concluded that free speech rights were best protected under the rule permitting CBS to refuse DNC access.
CBS v. DNC turned out to be the first in a line of decisions that
have held that the denial of a right of access is not of constitutional
155. 412 U.S. at 124; see also id. at 118-120 (discussing importance to listeners' free speech
rights of noninterference with "journalistic judgment of priorities").
156. Id. at 131.
157. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969). The Red Lion decision's approval of the fairness doctrine also embodies a trend to be avoided. The Supreme Court
approved the fairness doctrine's infringement on the broadcaster's speech, because the doctrine
supposedly caused the broadcast of messages that would otherwise be excluded from television.
But there was no evidence that the doctrine would facilitate the messages of marginalized speakers. Indeed, the marginalized messages could be impaired by a broadcaster complying with the
fairness doctrine. The mere protection of a large number of voices, see, e.g., Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1,20 n.18 (1945), or intended ideas, see, e.g., Red Lion, supra, is futile if
contextual and stylistic factors critical to a message are not protected as well.
158. SAID, supra note 2, at 216.
159. 412 U.S. at 131.
160. Id. at 130.
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significance, as long as the denied speaker still has an opportunity to
have its intended views conveyed in some form over the medium in
question, regardless of the fact that such opportunity would be in a
potentially unfavorable context.1 6 ' These decisions are especially curious because they each recognize, with respect to the party with whom
the desired right of access would interfere, that context, rather than
simply the chance to have an intended view voiced, is crucial to authentic, informative expression. The Court consistently refuses, however, to apply that realization to the exercise of free speech rights by
the speakers who claim a need for the right of access.
Moreover, the Court provides no explicit basis for using a double
standard. The CBS case was supposedly based exclusively upon the
question of whether the legal rule infringed upon the listeners' free
speech rights to an informative and rich public debate, rather than on
the grounds that CBS's ownership of the station included a fundamental right to exclude alien speech. 162 Nevertheless, Madison's warning
161. In Syracuse Peace Council v. F.C.C., 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1019 (1990), an anti-nuclear power group challenged the F.C.C.'s new rules that eliminate
the guarantee of fairness doctrine access. The Court upheld the rules, because (I) the "explosion" of radio and television media over the last twenty years ensured that speakers like plaintiff
could find a broadcast forum and (2) the fairness doctrine impinged on the capacity of broadcasters to communicate their messages. The Court engaged in minimal comparison of the degree of
infringment on the plaintiff's speech caused by using a marginal media outlet with the degree of
infringement on broadcasters' speech caused by enforcement of the fairness doctrine. Id. at 662.
Earlier the Supreme Court had issued a similar holding in a print medium case, Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). In that case, the Supreme Court struck down a statute
requiring newspapers to provide space for replies to editorial commments. Just as the plaintiff in
Syracuse Peace Council could go to another broadcast outlet, the party replying in Miami Herald
could easily find another print medium to convey its message. See Syracuse Peace Council, 867
F.2d at 683 (Starr, J., concurring) (implying that Syracuse Peace Council's recognition that
broadcast media are no longer scarce marks a point at which rights of access to the print and
broadcast media can be treated the same). The basis for the Miami Herald ruling was that any
infringment on the newspaper's communication was of major significance, while requiring the
replying party to find some other news print outlet did not result in any infringement on free
speech rights.
Another variation occurred in Pacific Gas and Electric Co. [PG&E] v. Public Utilities
Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986), where a public utility argued against a regulation which permitted a
consumer group to enclose a newsletter in the public utility's billing envelopes. The Court struck
down the regulation's creation of a right of access. The holding explained that putting the insert
in the envelope would infringe upon the utility's speech, while the consumer group's message
would be unaffected if the group sent its message by mail in another envelope. Again, the Court's
analysis was overly sensitive to the requirements of the communicative discipline of one party
(the utility) and insensitive to the communicative discipline of another party (the consumer
group).
162. In Syracuse Peace Council, Circuit Judge Starr's concurrence claims to be applying the
same standard to the speech of the broadcaster as to the speech of the plaintiff, because the rights
at stake are those of listeners rather than of either speaker. 867 F.2d at 685-86 n. 12 (Starr, J.
concurring).
In Miami Herald, the Court invokes the special historical respect of the government for the
absolute autonomy of newspaper editors.
In PG&E, the Court claims that the case is like Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) and
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), where individuals were relieved of the
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that interests of stability require the State to defer to the preexisting
distributions of rights of access in the private sector 63 appears to be
the controlling factor behind the Supreme Court's double standard.
The party limited to "fairness doctrine access" is always seeking to
justify a change of the distribution of access rights, while the party
protected against even the slightest additional infringement on the
context of its speech is always the party already in control of the strategic resource.
Deference to preexisting rights of access should not be a concern in
post-communist countries, where the only preexisting rights of access
are those of the State. The application of a double standard in the
protection of free speech rights would not lead to the development or
protection of a rich civil society, but to insulation of State domination
and to "suffocation" of developing associations. Moreover, as postcommunist courts review the privatization of scarce resources for
communication, such as the few broadcast stations which exist in that
part of the world, they must be careful not to invoke double standards
in the evaluation of a privatization's effects upon different groups'
speech. The post-communist courts should be especially suspect of
State decisions to grant absolute control of certain media to the State
or select private groups, while the State contends that marginalized
speech can be protected through devices, like the fairness doctrine,
which ignore access to control over crucial factors like context and
manner of presentation.
CONCLUSION

This article should enable readers to better understand the importance of a well-developed civil society to the existence of social autonomy in a political democracy. The origins, elements, and potential
consequences of the post-communist world's current crisis of civil society have also been reviewed. As the final section has shown, it is no
easy task to use constitutional law to ensure that State privatization
decisions carve out space so that the dynamics of modern civil society
can flourish. Nevertheless, this constitutional challenge must be unburden of attributing alien beliefs to themselves. In Wooley and Barnette,listeners' constitutional
rights to the conveyance of information and public debate were not factors. The extension of
Wooley and Barnette to cases in which the Court is protecting listener rights in public debate
results in absolute respect for the status quo distribution of rights of access. When the Wooley-

Barnette paradigm is applied to rights of access cases, any decision by the State to grant a right of
access that infringes on a preexisting right of access to a resource constitutes an unconstitutional
effort to make the infringed party bear the burden of alien speech.
163. See supra text accompanying note 20. The development of a "rights of access" jurisprudence will become increasingly significant to communications within society as new technologies
become available in Eastern Europe.
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dertaken, because of the tremendous obstacles that post-communist
civil society faces and the implications of the current crisis for the
future of an open society in the region.

